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As jurisdictions enact reforms creating 
legal access to cannabis for purposes other 
than exclusively “medical and scientific,” 
tensions surrounding the existing UN drug 
treaties and evolving law and practice in 
Member States continue to grow. How 
might governments and the UN system 
address these growing tensions in ways that 
acknowledge the policy shifts underway 
and help to modernize the drug treaty 
regime itself, and thereby reinforce the 
UN pillars of human rights, development, 
peace and security, and the rule of law?
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CANNABIS REFORMS AND TREATY TENSIONS: THE 
“ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM”
Cannabis prohibition has not proven to be an 
effective strategy for reducing the extent of the 
illicit market or cannabis health harms. Rather, it 
has imposed heavy burdens on criminal justice 
systems, produced profoundly negative social 
and public health impacts, and created criminal 
markets supporting organized crime, violence, 
and corruption. The legal regulation of cannabis 
markets has therefore become an increasingly 
attractive policy option for countries to consider, 
creating obvious tensions within the prohibitionist 
United Nations drug control treaty framework. 
Cannabis is one of the psychoactive substances 
included within the UN drug control regime, based 
on three treaties: the 1961 Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, the 
1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, 
and the 1988 Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. 
Current tensions arise 
from the decision to 
place cannabis under 
strict controls as part 
of the bedrock of the 
contemporary regime, the 1961 Single Convention. 
This states that, as with a range of other listed 
substances, “the production, manufacture, export, 
import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession” 
of cannabis should be limited “exclusively to 
medical and scientific purposes.”1 
Cannabis, the world’s most widely used illicit 
drug, is categorized within the Single Convention 
alongside cocaine and heroin.2 This decision, taken 
more than 50 years ago, had very little to do with 
consideration of the available scientific evidence 
concerning relative health risks. Today the drug 
conventions are, on the surface, among the most 
widely adhered to of all UN instruments.3 This 
veneer of virtually universal support, however, 
masks a number of important considerations. 
 
First, nations signed on to the Single Convention 
in an era dramatically different from the one 
we live in today. The treaty was being drafted 
and negotiated during the 1940s and 1950s, 
consolidating the structures and philosophy of a 
series of multilateral drug control treaties dating 
back to 1912.4 This was a period when drug issues 
were of only marginal concern for many states, 
permitting a few nations to dominate proceedings 
and steer the development of the international 
control system in their preferred prohibition-
oriented direction.
Authoritative studies suggesting that there was 
no need to impose international prohibition-
oriented controls on cannabis were largely 
ignored. Rather, activist delegations and key 
individuals from within the 
international drug control 
bureaucracy itself were 
successful in privileging 
sensationalist “research” 
findings to gradually 
bring cannabis into the 
increasingly prohibition-
focused multilateral control 
architecture. Pseudo-
scientific, often racist, 
reports of cannabis’ links 
to insanity, crime, moral decline, and its role as a 
gateway to other drugs succeeded in demonizing 
the substance and its users.5 
Remarkably, the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) Expert Committee on Drug Dependence 
(ECDD), the body charged by the 1961 and 1971 
Conventions with the scientific and medical review 
of scheduling proposals,6 has never engaged in 
a formal review of cannabis’ place within the 
Convention. As the Committee itself noted in 
2014, “Cannabis and cannabis resin has not been 
scientifically reviewed by the Expert Committee 
since the review by the Health Committee of the 
League of Nations in 1935.”7  
Second, dissatisfaction with the implications of 
cannabis’ status within the treaty system is not a new 
phenomenon. Numerous national and sub-national 
jurisdictions have questioned and increasingly 
moved away from the punitive prohibitions on 
Authoritative studies 
suggesting that there was no 
need to impose international 
prohibition-oriented controls 
on cannabis were largely 
ignored.
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cannabis encouraged by the Conventions. This has 
manifested in successive waves of what might be 
regarded as “soft defection,” whereby authorities 
tried to remain within the flexibility afforded by 
the treaty framework,8,9 but deviate from the 
prohibitive norm at the heart of the regime. 10
As early as the 1970s, and despite President Richard 
Nixon’s initiation of a “war on drugs,” a number 
of U.S. states formally decriminalized cannabis 
possession for personal use. At around the same 
time, Dutch authorities re-evaluated cannabis 
policies, leading to the development of the current 
cannabis “coffee shop” system. The International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB, the “independent, 
quasi-judicial expert body” overseeing 
implementation of the treaties) has long criticized 
the Dutch model as falling outside the bounds of 
the Conventions (although without providing the 
detailed legal reasoning behind that criticism).11 
 
A second wave of reforms—which has been referred 
to as a “quiet revolution” of decriminalization—has 
occurred more recently in several Latin American 
and European countries and within Australian 
states and territories.12 In Spain, an increasingly 
popular local approach by cannabis users to bypass 
the problems of the illicit market has been the 
establishment of Cannabis Social Clubs.13 These 
are intended to provide a de facto source of legal 
supply operating informally on a small-scale, non-
profit basis within a decriminalized model. 
In addition, a range of medical cannabis systems 
has emerged in many parts of the world, notably 
in more than 20 U.S. states. These systems 
have often been the focus of INCB criticism. 
While the INCB is on firm ground regarding its 
criticisms related to the 1961 Single Convention’s 
requirements to establish national-level agencies 
in charge of medical cannabis, the INCB exceeds its 
mandate when questioning the medical usefulness 
of the substance. That said, the blurring of the 
lines in some jurisdictions between cannabis use 
for genuine medical purposes and for pseudo-
medical and other uses has created a range of grey 
Two of the delegates to the seventh session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs exchanging views before a meeting: Mr. 
Saleh A. Mahmoud (left), of Egypt; and Mr. Harry J. Anslinger, of the United States. UN Photo/MB.
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markets that do little for the image of cannabis as 
a medicine.14 
Tensions also exist in relation to the traditional 
and religious use of cannabis. Acknowledging 
the challenges of eradicating the culturally and 
religiously ingrained use of cannabis within 
many societies, the Single Convention included 
a transitional reservation, allowing signatories 
to abandon such use gradually within 25 years 
of the Convention coming into force.15 With this 
deadline having quietly passed in 1989, it is clear 
that, unlike the more formalized policy shifts 
described above, many countries—particularly 
in the “global south”—are choosing to “turn a 
blind eye” to the cultivation and use prohibited 
under the Conventions.16 Furthermore, within the 
context of a greater appreciation of indigenous and 
religious rights, some countries, such as Jamaica, 
are finding themselves in an increasingly difficult 
position vis-à-vis the relationship between national 
legal instruments, the international drug control 
conventions, and other UN treaties on human and 
indigenous rights.17 
Meanwhile at the multilateral level, recent sessions 
of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND)—
the UN’s central policymaking body on drug 
issues—have seen some Member States, including 
Argentina, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, and 
Mexico, call openly for a re-evaluation of some 
aspects of the current treaty framework.18 
The tensions around cannabis within the treaty 
framework have come most dramatically to the 
fore in the Americas, with recent passage of laws 
that explicitly legalize and regulate cannabis for 
non-medical, non-scientific uses, a policy that 
is expressly forbidden by the UN drug treaties. 
Successful ballot initiatives in 2012 in the U.S. 
states of Colorado and Washington to establish 
legally taxed and regulated cannabis markets have 
been followed by initiatives in Alaska and Oregon. 
It is likely that other states, including California—
the world’s seventh largest economy—will follow 
imminently. 
At the national level, in December 2013, Uruguay 
became the first country in the world to legally 
regulate the cannabis market, with the passage 
of Law 19.172 granting the government control 
over the import, export, cultivation, production, 
and sale of cannabis through the newly established 
Institute for the Regulation and Control of 
Cannabis (Instituto de Regulación y Control del 
Cannabis, IRCCA).19 Even more recently, Canada’s 
new government was elected in 2015 pledging to 
legalize and regulate cannabis for non-medical, 
non-scientific use, and announced at UNGASS that 
it will introduce legislation in Spring 2017.20 And, 
with varying levels of political support, legislative 
proposals for cannabis regulation are also under 
consideration in Guatemala, Italy, Mexico, and 
Morocco. 
Clearly, tensions in the treaty regime around 
cannabis are long-standing and growing. The 
international community, including the UN drug 
control bureaucracy, has been well aware of 
these tensions for some time. Indeed, in a much-
remarked 2008 report, “Making Drug Control Fit 
for Purpose,” the Executive Director of the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) wrote that 
“Cannabis is the most vulnerable point in the whole 
multilateral edifice. In the Single Convention, it is 
supposed to be controlled with the same degree of 
severity as cocaine and the opiates. In practice, this 
is seldom the case, and many countries vacillate 
in the degree of control they exercise over 
cannabis.”21 
Since then, “soft defections” with regard to 
cannabis policy have given way to direct breaches of 
the Conventions’ ban on cannabis for non-medical 
or non-scientific purposes. As more jurisdictions 
appear likely to enact reforms to legalize and 
regulate adult use of cannabis, these treaty tensions 
have become the “elephant in the room” in key high-
level forums, including the 2016 United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on 
drugs—obviously present, but studiously ignored. 
Different countries and international agencies 
have different reasons for seeking to avoid directly 
engaging the question of what to do about these 
tensions. But the kinds of treaty breaches that 
may have seemed merely hypothetical only a few 
years ago are already a reality today, and will not 
simply disappear. Governments and the UN system 
should give serious consideration to options for 
managing these policy shifts in ways that can help 
to modernize the drug treaty regime itself, and to 
thereby reinforce the UN pillars of human rights, 
development, peace and security, and the rule of 
law.
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OPTIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD
A difficult dilemma has thus entered the international 
drug policy arena. There is no doubt that recent policy 
developments with regard to cannabis regulation 
have moved beyond the legal latitude of the treaties. 
Initiating a formal procedure to review or amend the 
current treaty framework, however, would not only 
immediately trigger an avalanche of political frictions 
with some of the most powerful countries in the 
world, but could even lead to unintended negative 
outcomes. Indeed, even as many governments 
continue to tout the supposed global consensus on 
drug policy, officials are quite aware of the significant 
and growing policy differences among drug treaty 
Member States; to the extent that a truly global 
consensus ever existed, it is now fractured, and there 
is no new consensus to take its place.
Under such conditions, it is not difficult to understand 
why many countries would prefer to avoid or 
delay confronting the treaty questions raised by 
cannabis regulation. 
Indeed, such concerns 
go far in explaining the 
attraction of the legally 
fallacious—but politically 
potent—stance that 
the drug treaties as 
they stand are flexible 
enough to accommodate 
the regulation of adult-
use cannabis. Different 
countries have different 
reasons for finding 
appeal in the notion of treaty flexibility. During the 
March 2016 negotiations in Vienna of the UNGASS 
Outcome Document, different strands of support 
for the idea of flexibility converged around language 
declaring that new challenges “should be addressed in 
conformity with the three international drug control 
conventions, which allow for sufficient flexibility for 
States parties to design and implement national drug 
policies according to their priorities and needs…” 
(Emphasis added).22 The same language was able to 
serve different, even contradictory, purposes. 
The wording of “sufficient flexibility” originates 
from the European Union (EU) common position 
on the UNGASS, where it was accompanied by 
the EU’s commitment to “maintain a strong and 
unequivocal commitment to the UN conventions.”23 
For the EU then, flexibility applies to policies such 
as harm reduction, decriminalization of possession 
and cultivation of cannabis for personal use, and 
alternatives to incarceration, but certainly not to 
cannabis regulation, which the EU considers as falling 
outside the scope of policy options allowed under 
the treaties. 
However, for governments for whom it would be 
politically convenient to maintain that cannabis 
regulation fits within the boundaries of the 
Conventions—especially the United States—
“sufficient flexibility” could be read as covering 
cannabis regulation. During the negotiations, that 
paragraph also received support from countries 
at the other end of the policy spectrum, including 
Russia and China. After all, they argued, the Single 
Convention also says that “a Party shall not be, or be 
deemed to be, precluded 
from adopting measures 
of control more strict or 
severe than those provided 
by this Convention” (article 
39); the treaties therefore 
provide countries with 
“sufficient flexibility” to 
continue with forced 
treatment or the death 
penalty. Attempts to rein in 
that line of argumentation 
achieved only a vague 
reference in the paragraph that national policies 
need to be consistent with “applicable international 
law.”
For countries like Jamaica or the Netherlands, 
implications of the term are very different. In those 
cases, where the principle of legal regulation enjoys 
broad political support, the fact that regulation 
would contravene international treaty obligations is 
considered an impediment for its implementation. As 
such, agreeing to language about “sufficient flexibility” 
amounts to taking a political stance against cannabis 
regulation, because, with a concern for international 
law, it is based on an understanding (an accurate 
understanding, and one shared by the INCB) that 
There is no doubt that 
recent policy developments 
with regard to cannabis 
regulation have moved 
beyond the legal latitude of 
the treaties.
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the UN drug conventions expressly disallow legal 
regulation. 
Lest there be doubt about the INCB’s views, INCB 
President Werner Sipp directly addressed the issue 
of flexibility in his keynote speech at the March 2016 
session of the CND, as the UNGASS document was 
under negotiation. Some proponents of new laws 
that permit the non-medical use of cannabis, he 
said, “pretend that the flexibility of the conventions 
allows such regulations. In fact, the debate on 
flexibility is at the core of the general debate on 
future drug policy because it regards the possibilities 
and the limitations of the Conventions. Undoubtedly, 
there exists flexibility in the Conventions—but 
not in each and every respect.” For example, Sipp 
explained, there is “no obligation stemming from 
the conventions to incarcerate drug users having 
committed minor offences,” and they “provide 
for flexibility in the determination of appropriate 
sanctions.” However, there is “no flexibility in the 
conventions for allowing and regulating any kind of 
non-medical use” (Emphasis in the original).24 These 
declarations expanded upon Sipp’s foreword to the 
INCB report for 2015, in which he wrote: “States 
parties to the treaties have a certain flexibility in their 
interpretation and implementation of the treaties, 
within the boundaries that they themselves set out 
and agreed upon during treaty negotiations.”25 
The UNGASS document negotiators—in settling on 
language with such different and even contradictory 
meanings to different sets of countries—did achieve 
what most countries wanted: a way to avoid opening 
a debate on the adequacy of the treaties themselves. 
The fact remains, however, that the accelerating 
process of national reforms has already moved 
cannabis policies beyond the boundaries of what 
the Conventions can legally accommodate. To move 
the debate forward, this paper aims to illuminate 
the available options for countries to ensure that 
their new domestic cannabis laws and policies are 
aligned with their international obligations, thereby 
modernizing the global drug control system in ways 
consistent with international law and the overarching 
purposes of the UN system. 
Mindful of the political tensions that have been evident 
during the 2016 UNGASS process, it is important to 
emphasize that treaty reform does not necessarily 
require negotiating a new global consensus. This 
paper therefore distinguishes four categories of 
reforms, acknowledging that the different options 
are often overlapping and not necessarily mutually 
exclusive:
Above, cannabis as both a licit medical product and police evidence.
FOUR CATEGORIES OF REFORMS
I. Treaty reform that applies to all signatory  
 states,  requiring consensus approval;
II. Treaty reform that applies to all signatory  
 states,  requiring majority approval;
III. Treaty reform that applies to a selective  
 group of states; and
IV. Treaty reform that applies to an individual  
 state.
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TREATY AMENDMENT
Any State party can notify the UN Secretary 
General of a proposed amendment, including 
the reasoning behind the move. The Secretary 
General then communicates the proposed 
amendment and the reasons for it to the State 
parties and to the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), which can decide to:
• Convene a Conference of all the Parties (COP) 
of the treaty to consider the amendment;
• Ask the Parties if they accept the amendment; 
or
• Take no action and wait to see whether any 
State party submits any objection. 
In the event of no Party rejecting the amendment 
within 18 months (24 months for the 1988 
Convention), the amendment is automatically 
accepted. In the case of the 1961 and 1971 
Conventions, the amendment then immediately 
comes into force for all Parties (that is, no 
objections equals acceptance), while in the case of 
the 1988 Convention, the amendment only comes 
into force for those parties that “deposited with 
the Secretary-General an instrument expressing 
its consent to be bound by that amendment” (that 
is, explicit notification of acceptance is required).26 
In the event State parties register objections to 
a proposed amendment, ECOSOC can decide to:
• Still approve the amendment (in which case 
it would not be applicable to the objecting 
states);
• Reject it (if multiple objections are raised that 
argue convincingly that such an amendment 
would compromise the object and purpose of 
the treaty); or
• Convene a COP to consider the amendment.
In addition, ECOSOC may also submit proposed 
amendments to the General Assembly for 
consideration.27 Moreover, the General Assembly 
may itself take the initiative to convene a COP, 
and even has the power to discuss and adopt 
amendments to UN conventions by simple 
majority vote.
In theory, all three UN drug control conventions 
could be amended using these procedures. While 
many consider this to be a politically unlikely 
scenario for the foreseeable future, it is important 
to recall that the 1961 Single Convention was 
amended with the 1972 Protocol, after a COP was 
convened and agreed to substantial treaty changes. 
At that stage, the U.S. government argued that 
it was “time for the international community to 
build on the foundation of the Single Convention, 
since a decade has given a better perspective 
of its strengths and weaknesses.”28 The latitude 
under the 1961 Single Convention with regard 
to alternatives to incarceration—which has been 
the focus of many recent debates—only exists 
due to a treaty amendment agreed in the 1972 
Protocol.29 
For historical perspective, it is also useful to recall 
that many decisions in the process of negotiating 
the drug treaties were taken by majority vote. 
The false perception that the UN drug control 
system has always relied on full consensus is a 
more recent construct, intended to reinforce an 
image of universal agreement even as tensions 
were becoming ever more visible. Moreover, in 
the event that treaty amendments are approved, 
States can opt not to become part of the amended 
agreement. As the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) makes clear: “The 
amending agreement does not bind any State 
already a party to the treaty which does not 
become a party to the amending agreement.”30 
As such, States that do not wish to be bound 
by the treaty as amended may retain the older 
obligations.31 
Most modern treaties, including the 2000 
Transnational Organized Crime Convention 
(UNTOC), the 2003 Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC), and the 2003 WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) have an inbuilt COP mechanism that 
requires them to undergo periodic reviews 
I. TREATY REFORM THAT APPLIES TO ALL SIGNATORY 
STATES, REQUIRING CONSENSUS APPROVAL
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and enables them to evolve and modernize if 
necessary. The international drug control treaty 
regime, however, with its roots predating the UN, 
lacks such a periodic review mechanism—which 
helps to explain its outdated nature and resistance 
to reform. The challenge of modernizing the drug 
control regime via a COP mechanism is further 
complicated by the fact that that the regime 
consists of three separate treaties, all of which 
would require amendment. A more rational course 
of systemic evolution could be to try and resolve 
the inconsistencies between the 1961 and 1971 
Conventions by merging them, together with the 
precursor controls under the 1988 Convention, 
into a new Single Convention that featured:
• A structured periodic review mechanism;
• An improved scheduling procedure, striking a 
better balance between assuring availability 
of controlled substances for legitimate uses 
versus preventing abuse;
• A more tolerant and legally consistent 
approach to traditional, spiritual, and non-
problematic social uses; and
• Incorporation of the other elements from the 
1988 drug treaty into the subsequent treaties 
addressing organized crime and corruption, 
with which the 1988 drug treaty is already 
closely aligned.
Discussions on more substantive reforms of 
this nature have yet to occur formally, although 
they have been suggested in the Organization of 
American States’ 2013 report Scenarios for the 
Drug Problem in the Americas.32 
II. TREATY REFORM THAT APPLIES TO ALL SIGNATORY 
STATES, REQUIRING MAJORITY APPROVAL
RESCHEDULING
As noted above, cannabis first entered the 
international drug control system under the 
League of Nations on dubious grounds, and its 
current placement in schedules I and IV of the 
Single Convention has never been properly 
reviewed by the WHO Expert Committee.33 
This is in itself sufficient reason to question on 
procedural grounds the legitimacy of the current 
classification of cannabis. 
The 1961 Single Convention allows for the 
WHO or any State party to initiate, at any time, 
the modification process that could reschedule a 
specified drug or delete it from the Conventions. 
The WHO is the only body mandated to make 
scheduling recommendations, which must 
subsequently be agreed by the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND). Modifying schedules 
does not require consensus; these are the only 
decisions the CND takes by vote. New substances 
are routinely scheduled in this way, and the 
treaty system is thus constantly being modified. 
In the case of cannabis, scheduled under the 
Single Convention, a rescheduling decision would 
be taken by a simple majority of its “members 
present and voting.”34 Delta-9-THC (the main 
active ingredient in cannabis, or dronabinol, as the 
pharmaceutical extract is known), is scheduled 
as a ‘psychotropic substance’ under the 1971 
Convention, where a rescheduling decision 
requires a two-thirds majority; in fact, dronabinol 
has been recommended for re-scheduling already 
several times by the WHO Expert Committee on 
Drug Dependence.35 
For cannabis, however, this process is further 
complicated by the fact that it (along with coca 
and opium) is also mentioned explicitly in specific 
articles within the 1961 and 1988 Conventions. 
Re-scheduling or de-scheduling cannabis may 
therefore not be sufficient to allow for fully 
regulated markets along the lines of the changes 
now being enacted in various jurisdictions 
today. Most likely, some form of amendment, 
modification, or reservation to those treaties 
would also be required.
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“INTER SE” TREATY 
MODIFICATION
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) also allows for the option to modify 
treaties between certain parties only, offering in 
this context an intriguing and under-explored legal 
option somewhere between selective denunciation 
and a collective reservation (see below). According to 
Article 41 of the VCLT, “Two or more of the parties 
to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement 
to modify the treaty as between themselves alone,” 
as long as it “does not affect the enjoyment by the 
other parties of their rights under the treaty or 
the performance of their obligations” and it is not 
“incompatible with the effective execution of the 
object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.”36 
In principle, both conditions could be met. It 
would require that the agreement include a clear 
commitment to the original treaty obligations vis-
à-vis countries not party to the inter se modification 
agreement, especially concerning prevention of 
trade or leakage to prohibited jurisdictions. All 
the provisions in the treaties—including those 
pertaining to cannabis—would remain in force vis-
à-vis the treaty’s State parties that are not part of 
the inter se agreement. Over time, such an inter se 
agreement might evolve into an alternative treaty 
framework to which more and more countries 
could adhere, while avoiding the cumbersome (if 
not impossible) process of unanimous approval of 
amendments to the current regime.37
In theory, modification inter se could be used by a 
group of like-minded countries that wish to resolve 
the treaty non-compliance issues resulting from 
national decisions to legally regulate the cannabis 
market, as Uruguay has already done, and Canada 
appears poised to do. Such countries could sign 
an agreement with effect only among themselves, 
modifying or annulling the cannabis control 
provisions of the UN conventions. This could also 
be an interesting option to explore in order to 
provide a legal basis justifying international trade 
between national jurisdictions that allow or tolerate 
the existence of a licit market of a substance under 
domestic legal provisions, but for which international 
trade is not permitted under the current UN treaty 
obligations.
The drafters of the 1969 VCLT considered the 
option of inter se modification as a core principle 
for international law, and the issue was discussed 
at length at the International Law Commission in 
1964: “The importance of the subject needed 
no emphasis; it involved reconciling the need 
to safeguard the stability of treaties with the 
requirements of peaceful change.”38 From the very 
beginning, the evolutionary nature of treaties was 
seen as fundamental to the UN system—a system 
in which all Member States “undertake to respect 
agreements and treaties to which they have become 
contracting parties without prejudice to the right of 
revision,” according to the Egyptian delegate at the 
time. He underscored that it was therefore “equally 
important to ensure that arbitrary obstacles were 
not allowed to impede the process of change. There 
had been many instances in the past of States, by 
their stubborn refusal to consider modifying a 
treaty, forcing others to denounce it.”39 
A leading authority on international treaty law, 
Jan Klabbers, describes the inter se option as 
“perhaps the most elegant way out,” but also notes 
that though inter se modification is based on an 
ancient principle of international law, “practical 
examples are hard to come by.”40 Indeed, it seems 
this is essentially uncharted legal territory, but 
a good case could be made that the increasing 
tensions between cannabis policy trends and the 
frozen drug treaty system provides a clear example 
of circumstances for which this exceptional 
option was designed and deemed to be of crucial 
importance. Indeed, though its use has been rare, 
the inter se option has been understood since the 
outset of the UN system as a means of reinforcing 
treaty regimes, not undermining them. Where 
regimes are exceptionally resistant to reform, and 
therefore liable to become brittle and antiquated, 
an option such as inter se modification could actually 
strengthen the regime by demonstrating that it is 
capable of modernization.
III. TREATY REFORM THAT APPLIES TO A GROUP 
OF STATES
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A. WITHDRAWING FROM THE  
 TREATIES
In light of the outdated nature of the drug control 
treaties and the seemingly insurmountable 
procedural and political obstacles to modernizing 
them, the question is often raised why countries 
should not simply withdraw from the UN drug 
control treaty regime. The option exists for any 
signatory Member States to withdraw from the 
treaties via the process of denunciation; treaty exit 
would technically “solve” the problems of breach 
or non-compliance from a legal perspective. 
However, a key reason reform-minded states 
may wish to remain party to the UN drug 
control treaties is that they also regulate the 
global trade in drugs for licit medical purposes, 
including substances on the WHO list of essential 
medicines. Inadequate access to controlled 
medicines is already a severe problem in most 
developing countries, and withdrawing from the 
INCB-administered global system of estimates 
and requirements operating under the UN drug 
control conventions could risk making it even 
worse.
For countries receiving development aid or 
benefitting from preferential trade agreements, 
denunciation would also risk triggering economic 
sanctions. Being State party to all three of 
the drug control conventions is a condition in 
a number of preferential trade agreements 
or for accession to the European Union. 
The U.S. government—though now more 
likely to be lenient towards cannabis reforms 
elsewhere due to the changes underway within 
U.S. borders—still maintains the disciplinary 
certification mechanism, and withdrawal from 
the drug control treaties altogether would 
almost certainly lead to decertification and 
sanctions. Denunciation can therefore have 
serious political and economic implications, 
especially for less powerful and poor countries. 
Even for countries that are less economically 
vulnerable, simply withdrawing from the drug 
treaties could carry the risk of reputational costs. 
B. SELECTIVE DENUNCIATION
The 1969 VCLT stipulates that a historical 
“error” (Article 48) or a “fundamental change 
of circumstances” (rebus sic stantibus, Article 
62) are valid reasons for a Member State to 
revoke its adherence to a treaty.41 However, 
recourse to the rebus sic stantibus doctrine and 
the option of “selective denunciation” are rarities 
in international law. The Beckley Foundation’s 
Global Cannabis Commission report concluded in 
2008 that “taking this path might be less legally 
defensible than denunciation and reaccessions 
with reservations” (see below), which would have 
the same end result.42 And for a group of countries, 
the option of an inter se agreement seems to be 
the more elegant way out, with similar effect. 
C. DENUNCIATION  
 FOLLOWED BY RE-  
 ACCESSION WITH A   
 RESERVATION 
At the moment of signing, acceding, or ratifying a 
treaty, states have the option to make reservations 
regarding specific provisions, as many countries 
in fact did in the case of all three drug control 
treaties.43 Reservations or other formal unilateral 
“interpretive declarations” are meant to exclude or 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a 
treaty for the reserving state.
Under the procedure of treaty denunciation 
followed by re-accession with a reservation, 
a country can withdraw itself from the treaty 
entirely, with the intention of rejoining with specific 
reservations. In the case of the 1961 Convention, if 
one third or more State parties object, the country 
would be blocked from re-acceding.44 Denunciation 
and re-accession with a reservation is recognized 
as a legitimate procedure, although its practice has 
been limited to exceptional cases.45, 46 
In the case of the drug treaties, there is a recent 
precedent: in 2011, Bolivia notified the Secretary 
General that it had decided to exit the Single 
IV. TREATY REFORM THAT APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL 
STATES
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Convention, taking effect in January 2012, 
intending to re-accede with reservations regarding 
coca. The INCB condemned the move, and 15 
countries—including every member of the G8—
submitted formal objections. But the number of 
objections fell far short of the 62 (one third of all 
State parties to the Convention) that were needed 
to block Bolivia from re-acceding. In early 2013, 
Bolivia’s re-adherence to the treaty was formally 
accepted, with reservations upholding the right to 
allow in its territory traditional coca leaf chewing, 
the use of the coca leaf in its natural state, and the 
cultivation, trade, and possession of the coca leaf 
to the extent necessary for these licit purposes. 
(Bolivia had initially tried to amend the treaties, 
but was blocked by a small number of objections.) 
The procedure thus successfully resolved the 
legal tensions, at least for Bolivia, between the 
1961 Single Convention’s obligation to abolish 
its indigenous coca culture, versus Bolivia’s legal 
obligations under the 2007 UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and its national 
Constitution to protect it.
A reservation by which a state would exempt itself 
from implementing the Convention’s obligations 
for cannabis could therefore be attempted 
following the same treaty procedure, but there 
are differences to be taken into account. The 
main legal issue relates to article 19 of the VCLT, 
which requires that a reservation must not be 
“incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty.” Those overall aims of the Single Convention 
are expressed in the preamble’s opening paragraph 
regarding concern about “the health and welfare 
of mankind” and the treaty’s general obligation to 
limit controlled drugs “exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes.” Making a reservation exempting 
a particular substance from the treaty’s general 
obligation to limit drugs exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes is explicitly mentioned in the 
Commentary on the Single Convention as an option 
that could be procedurally allowable, for coca leaf 
as well as for cannabis.47 While the absence of any 
accompanying cautionary text seems to imply that 
exemption by means of a reservation of a specific 
substance from the general obligations would 
not in itself constitute a conflict with the object 
and purpose of the treaty as a whole, this would 
certainly be an important legal discussion to be had 
in the context of crafting reservations. The same 
issues would arise with an inter se agreement (see 
above), which comes close to a form of “collective 
reservation.”
 
Coca is dried in Bolivia. Courtesy Sara Shahriari.
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SIDE-STEPPING OR DENYING ISSUES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
The two States that have thus far proceeded with 
development and implementation of formal non-
medical cannabis markets are the United States and 
Uruguay. Their situations are very different and they 
have provided contrasting commentaries on the 
implications of their moves, while both arguing that 
policy shifts within their borders do not put them in 
breach of the UN drug control conventions. 
Uruguay has argued its policy is fully in line with the 
original objectives that the drug control treaties 
emphasized, but have subsequently failed to 
achieve—namely, the protection of the health and 
welfare of humankind. Uruguayan authorities have 
specifically argued that the creation of a regulated 
market for adult use of cannabis is driven by health 
and security imperatives and is therefore an issue 
of human rights. As such, officials point to wider UN 
human rights obligations that need to be respected, 
specifically appealing to the precedence of human 
rights principles over drug control obligations. As the 
first country courageous enough to take the step 
of regulating cannabis for all uses, it is enormously 
significant that Uruguay has explained its reform with 
reference to its overarching human rights obligations 
under international law.48 Moreover, while reluctant 
to acknowledge its cannabis regulation model 
represents non-compliance with the drug treaties, 
Uruguay has noted that it creates legal tensions 
within the treaty system that may require revision 
and modernization. At the 2013 CND session, for 
example, Diego Cánepa, head of the Uruguayan 
delegation, declared: “Today more than ever we need 
the leadership and courage to discuss if a revision 
and modernization is required of the international 
instruments adopted over the last fifty years.”49 
U.S. officials, for their part, have argued that since the 
cultivation, trade, and possession of cannabis taking 
place in multiple U.S. states remain criminal offenses 
under U.S. federal law, the federal government as 
State party to the Conventions is not in breach. 
This is despite the federal government’s decision 
to accommodate the state-level developments, 
provided they proceed within certain parameters.50 
A recent U.S. discourse, promoted by Ambassador 
William Brownfield (Assistant Secretary for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs), maintains that the extant treaty framework 
possesses sufficient flexibility to allow for regulated 
cannabis markets.51 This argument is strained by 
any reasonable understanding of the treaties and 
their overtly prohibitionist object and purpose—
and appears to reflect political expediency rather 
than convincing legal reasoning.52 A good case can 
be made that the main objective of Ambassador 
Brownfield’s flexibility argument is to “prevent clear 
treaty breaches of state-level cannabis legalization 
initiatives from triggering an open international 
debate on treaty reform.”53 Nevertheless, such a 
debate is now inevitable, not least since the INCB has 
made clear statements that both Uruguayan and U.S. 
cannabis regulation models are not in compliance 
with the treaties, and Brownfield has himself 
acknowledged the INCB’s authority in determining 
whether or not State parties are in compliance.54 
An argument has also been made (although not by 
any State parties) that legal regulation is possible 
within the bounds of the treaties by interpreting 
the Conventions’ “scientific purposes” language to 
include experimentation with alternative regulatory 
options, so long as these are researched. This, 
however, misunderstands the meaning of “scientific 
purposes” within the treaties, confusing the uses 
to which substances may be put with the scientific 
or evidence base for policy. It also takes the phrase 
out of its context, both within the article concerned 
and the treaty as a whole, contrary to basic Vienna 
Convention rules on interpretation.55 
IMPLEMENTING CANNABIS REGULATION IN 
SITUATIONS OF TREATY NON-COMPLIANCE
The treaty reform options described above—with 
their varying procedural and political considerations—
all assume a decision on the part of at least one State 
to proactively alter its relationship to the current 
treaties with respect to cannabis. States might opt to 
sidestep the treaty questions that arise in the context 
of their cannabis reforms, or assert that the changes 
underway within their countries are allowable under 
the treaties as they stand, therefore denying that 
treaty reform options of any sort ought or need to 
be considered. Another option—acknowledging 
the fact of temporary non-compliance and working 
toward an eventual realignment of domestic law 
and treaty obligations—would open the door to 
deliberately pursuing some set of treaty reform 
options.
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PROCEEDING IN “PRINCIPLED NON-COMPLIANCE”
Rather than attempting to argue why legally regulating 
cannabis would not constitute a compliance problem 
with the 1961 and 1988 Conventions, States that 
wish to proceed with legal regulation could instead 
openly acknowledge that doing so would result in non-
compliance. Crucially, this option requires that the 
State sets out its reasons for national policy reform, 
how this affects compliance, and in particular why this 
is necessary for the realization of other international 
legal and policy commitments. Moreover this situation 
of non-compliance should be seen and presented as 
temporary, with the aim of ensuring the realignment 
of the country’s new domestic laws and practice 
with its treaty obligations as part-and-parcel of the 
reform initiative. The State should, in parallel, request 
multilateral discussions to resolve the situation, for 
example through supporting an expert advisory group 
on the reform of the conventions,56 and supporting a 
later Conference of the Parties (COP). Pending those 
developments, the State would carry on in conformity 
with its remaining commitments under the treaties, 
report as usual to the INCB, and report to the CND 
on the outcomes of its policies.
Clearly, open non-compliance with international 
legal obligations is not desirable, but all of the reform 
options set out in this paper are driven by necessity. 
The problem here is not that countries are opting 
for regulatory approaches. Rather, outmoded and 
unworkable treaty provisions are the problem that 
gives rise to the need for a temporary 
and transitional period of principled 
non-compliance. In this context the 
recognition of the fact that a State can no 
longer fully comply with the Conventions’ 
obligations regarding cannabis need not 
be seen as disrespect for the rule of law. 
To the contrary, it confirms that treaty 
commitments matter. Indeed, treaty non-
compliance as domestic laws and practice 
change is a fairly common feature of 
regime evolution and modernization.57 
Waving away worries about non-
compliance by resorting to dubious legal 
justifications is much more an expression 
of disrespect for international law. Many 
governments reforming their cannabis 
laws are doing so based on health, 
development, human rights, security, or 
other grounds, and out of a concern for the 
international legal commitments made in these areas, 
the realization of which has been negatively affected 
by the implementation of the drugs conventions. As 
the Global Commission on Drug Policy has argued: 
Unilateral defections from the drug treaties 
are undesirable from the perspective of 
international relations and a system built 
on consensus. Yet the integrity of that very 
system is not served in the long run by 
dogmatic adherence to an outdated and 
dysfunctional normative framework. The 
evolution of legal systems to account for 
changing circumstances is fundamental to 
their survival and utility, and the regulatory 
experiments being pursued by various states 
are acting as a catalyst for this process. 
Indeed, respect for the rule of law requires 
challenging those laws that are generating 
harm or that are ineffective.58 
Moreover, what we can now see is that it is not the 
case that States will face significant condemnation 
from the international community for cannabis re-
forms that are increasingly common practice across 
the world. Opting for reform and acknowledging 
non-compliance can help set the stage for treaty re-
form options that can be implemented collectively 
among like-minded States, such as the inter se option.
 
Cannabis drying in Morocco. Courtesy Pien Metaal.
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TRANSITIONING TO AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REGIME SUPPORTIVE OF DRUG MARKET REGULATION
More and more States are acknowledging the 
powerful arguments for questioning the treaty-
imposed prohibition model for cannabis control. 
As outlined here, the original inclusion of cannabis 
within the current international framework is the 
result of questionable procedures and dubious 
evidence. No formal review that meets currently 
accepted standards and scientific knowledge has ever 
taken place. For all these reasons, multiple forms of 
soft defection, non-compliance, decriminalization, 
and de facto regulation have persisted in countries 
where traditional use is widespread, and have since 
blossomed around the world to almost every nation 
or territory where cannabis has become popular in 
the past half century.
Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy, 
and policy experimentation have now reached the 
point where de jure legal regulation of the whole 
cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even 
if it violates certain outdated elements of the UN 
conventions. Tensions are likely to further increase 
between countries pursuing regulatory approaches 
and those strongly in favor of defending the status 
quo as well as the UN drug control system and its 
specialized agencies.
In the untidy conflict of procedural and political 
constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement 
towards a modernized global drug control regime, 
the system will likely go through a further period 
of legally dubious interpretations and questionable 
justifications for growing numbers of national and 
sub-national reforms. And the situation is unlikely to 
change until a tipping point is reached and a group 
of like-minded countries is ready to engage in the 
challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing 
legal inconsistencies and disputes.
The inevitability of further cannabis reforms looks 
set to be the issue that opens the debate around the 
UN drug control treaty system, and questions around 
potential regulation models for other drugs are likely 
to appear on the table sooner or later. In fact, that 
debate has already started with regard to coca leaf and 
other psychoactive plants, and has regularly surfaced 
in the context of responses to New Psychoactive 
Substances (NPS). While the arguments driving the 
current dynamic towards cannabis regulation do 
not all apply in the same ways to other controlled 
substances, ongoing reforms focused on cannabis are 
not the end of the story, but are likely to act as the 
catalyst for reviewing the efficacy of the international 
drug control system for certain other substances as 
well. Such a situation must be taken into account as 
discussions around cannabis develop. 
Indeed, the question now appearing on the 
international policy agenda is no longer whether or 
not there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN 
drug control system, but rather when and how. The 
question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough 
to deal with the growing tensions and to transform 
the current system in an orderly fashion into one 
more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and 
one that is more compatible with basic scientific 
norms and modern UN standards. Key elements of an 
effective strategy for moving forward should include: 
PROMOTING HIGH-LEVEL 
DIALOGUE ON RESOLVING 
THE TENSIONS BETWEEN 
EMERGING STATE PRACTICE 
AND OUTDATED AND 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS
States seeking to explore, develop, or actively 
implement cannabis regulation models will all face 
different legal and political challenges, domestically 
and internationally. Whatever reforms are 
undertaken, States should ensure that the issue is 
explored, rather than ignored, in key multilateral fora. 
Leadership from reform-minded States in promoting 
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this debate will be vital. There are a number of ways in 
which this dialogue can be informed and encouraged:
• Supporting proposals for an expert advisory 
group to consider issues around emerging 
challenges—including cannabis regulation—
and modernization of the international drug 
control framework, and make recommendations 
to inform the UN debate in the lead up to 2019, 
when a new UN Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action are due to be adopted. Such proposals are 
already being actively promoted by a number of 
State parties.59 
• Proceeding with formal mechanisms for 
reforming the treaty system—such as 
amendment, modification, reservation options, 
or more substantive change. Even if not initially 
successful, such actions will both ensure the 
question of treaty modernization is meaningfully 
considered within established fora, and 
demonstrate the desire of reform-minded States 
to resolve tensions and potential non-compliance 
issues using established legal mechanisms.
• Convening informal drug policy dialogues or 
intergovernmental conferences for like-minded 
States to discuss shared concerns and dilemmas 
outside of the institutional framework of the UN 
and regional structures such as the OAS and EU, 
and perhaps prepare resolutions for consideration 
in the CND and other UN or regional fora.
PURSUING DOMESTIC 
REFORMS IN PARALLEL WITH 
MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE AND 
REFORM PROCESSES
Modernization of the treaty framework to 
accommodate the needs of reform-minded States is 
now seemingly inevitable as the number of dissenting 
States grows. Unless the treaty system can begin to 
prove itself capable of modernizing, it risks drifting 
into irrelevance, affecting not only those elements 
that are clearly outmoded and ripe for reform, but also 
elements upon which relative consensus still exists. 
Achieving formal multilateral reforms, however, is 
likely to entail a difficult and protracted process. Until 
these are concluded, reforms in the short term are 
likely to involve multiple States moving into technical, 
transitionary non-compliance. The challenges this 
raises can be minimized by:
• Avoiding sidestepping or denial of non-compliance 
by offering implausible legal justifications.
• Acknowledging temporary “principled non-
compliance” and providing reasoning for doing so, 
rooted in the health and welfare of citizens, and 
wider UN Charter commitments.
• Actively promoting multilateral debate and 
reform efforts (as above) in parallel with domestic 
reforms.
• Establishing a cannabis regulation model60 that 
clearly establishes public health and wellbeing as 
a central goal, operates under a national agency, 
and minimizes negative impacts for neighboring 
States.
• Ensuring a framework for comprehensive 
monitoring and evaluation with regular reporting 
to national legislatures and relevant UN agencies 
and other stakeholders.61
PURSUING COLLECTIVE ACTION
Any attempts to promote high-level dialogue, 
explore domestic reform, or achieve reforms of the 
multilateral framework will be facilitated by collective 
action of like-minded States working towards a 
common cause. By building on the diversity of 
the various countries, such an alliance of reform-
minded States can lay the groundwork for a more 
effective approach to cannabis policy that, over 
time, can prove itself and attract more adherents. 
By working in coordination rather than in isolation, 
the initial reform-minded States can learn from one 
another and also provide leadership in opening the 
political space for other countries to move beyond 
prohibitionist approaches that have proven so 
detrimental to human health, development, security, 
and the rule of law itself.62
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